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#fear&loathing in Sydney: Law, Justice and
the Experience of Fear in a Hashtag World

Cassandra Sharp
Abstract, It is now commonplace for political discourse, news reports, and
popular ﬁctions to draw on themes of political violence and threats to
national and individual security as mechanisms for the perpetuation of fear.
Stories (whether ﬁctive or factual) of terrorism, crisis, surveillance, racial stereotyping, and the fallibility of law have become a very real part of the mediated experience of fear for the public, and they provoke a number of questions
surrounding complex issues of protectionism, identity, trust, and the conﬂation of law and justice. It has been argued that such stories are constructed
and utilized by key decision-makers as effective politicking in order to promote protectionist policies and activities. In recognizing that this “politics of
fear” rests upon public assumptions and beliefs concerning safety and risk, it
is important to understand how a public experience of fear is actually
expressed and constituted in the public imaginary. Using social media as an
interesting lens through which we can understand how fear is deﬁned and
realized in everyday social interaction, the paper will demonstrate that in
times of high alert Twitter provides access to an articulated experience of
fear. This paper will qualitatively explore the co-production and (re)circulation of these assumptions and beliefs through one particular story: the “Sydney Siege” hostage event of December 2014. By focusing on the Twitter
response to this event, the paper provides an empirical account of public critique of law’s justice narrative through the emotional experience and expression of fear. Drawing on critical content analysis and the Aristotelian
discourse analysis method, the paper illustrates the complicity of social
media, emotion and a prevalent rhetoric of fear in the reinforcement of law’s
justice narrative during times of high alert or crisis.
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Is it even safe to leave your home anymore? Can we as Australians
walk freely down the street without the fear of terrorism? #sydneysiege (@ItsMinaYo, December 14)
Fear is a powerful force that finds its way easily into our psyches. Consider the last
time you might have encountered significant fear? What emotions were manifested,
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and what physical reactions did you have? Whatever the circumstances, an experience of fear is something with which most can identify. Yet, now consider whether
it would be something about which you would express publicly online? Perhaps not
if it were a truly personal experience of fear, but certainly, during times of high public alert or crisis, individuals are increasingly tweeting or posting an update about
personal responses to these significant or distressing events. Living as we do within
a contemporary landscape that includes various forms of participatory media, the
cultural and communal experience and articulation of fear can easily dominate and
captivate the public imaginary.
The comments cited above were posted on Twitter in response to the 2014 Sydney Siege hostage event. Over a period of two weeks, approximately 5.5 million
tweets were posted with the hashtag “Sydneysiege” (#sydneysiege). Similar to the
examples above, contained within these tweets were the sound bites of fear, anger,
and vulnerability, along with clear evidence that, individually and collectively,
users were attempting to come to terms with this significant and tragic event. Not
only this, but interwoven through this storied tapestry of public comment was an
emotional critique of legality and justice that belied communal insecurity and
apprehension. Despite the embeddedness of social media in “everyday social and
communicative interactions,”1 particularly during traumatic crisis events, little to
no research has been done to explore empirically the public legal understanding generated by such events, or to explore how complex ideas of terror, fear and security
are expressed in the discursive space offered by social media. This article seeks to
fill that gap by providing a qualitative account of the role of public comment and
conversation in perpetuating a rhetoric of fear – in particular, focusing on the coproduction and (re)circulation of everyday assumptions and beliefs through the
story of a hostage event that came to be termed the “Sydney Siege.” On Monday
December 15, 2014, at 8.33am, a single gunman, Man Monis, took 17 people hostage
in the Lindt Caf
e in Martin Place, Central Sydney. It was a siege that lasted over
17 hours, and violently ended with police storming the building, the gunman being
killed, and, tragically, the deaths of two hostages. During that time many of us will
have “wondered how we would have reacted had we been trapped in the siege and
faced” these circumstances,2 and it was easy to recognize the powerful work of fear
as it moved its way easily into a collective consciousness.
The Sydney Siege was a dramatic local event viewed globally, and it seemed to
engage emotions significantly through both mainstream and social media. Julie
Posetti argues that the communication of traumatic crisis events like the Sydney
Siege no longer relies “exclusively on mainstream media reporters bound by traditional publication deadlines,”3 but instead, the prolific activity of social media now
ensures that local coverage “unfolds instantly in an international context.”4 And so
on December 15, it seemed that global eyes had turned their attention to this heartbreaking event as it unfolded. Social media platforms became hyperactive, with voyeurism transformed into dynamic conversation that responded in real time to each
30
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development as it was reported by both mainstream media and citizen journalists.
Saturating what became a natural outpouring of anguish, anger, resentment, and
grief was a concentrated rhetoric of fear containing comments about Islamic
extremists and questions about individual and national security. Twitter, of course,
was no exception. The focus of this article is to analyze the comments uploaded to
Twitter in response to this event as a way of empirically exploring a collective
expression of fear. As such, the next section of the article will briefly comment of
the rhetoric of fear, while the third section will contextualize the use of critical content analysis and the Aristotelian discourse analysis method for analyzing social
media. The fourth section will then illustrate the complicity of social media and
emotion in simultaneously perpetuating, and critiquing, law’s narrative of justice.
THE RHETORIC OF “FEAR”
The culture of fear has existed long before the “War on Terror” became a ubiquitous
term,5 with its defining feature being a belief that “humanity [will often be] confronted by powerful destructive forces that threaten our everyday existence.”6
Although not all these have been associated with crime (financial destruction, pandemic viruses, global warming, and the sustainability of the Earth), a culture of
fear does seem to be heavily associated with criminal activity.7 But since 9/11, a particular culture of fear, within the context of terror, has become a characteristic
aspect of everyday discourse,8 where it seems natural to have a “fatalistic
sensibility”9 when it comes to terrorism and its related activities. This is a “not if,
but when” sensibility to life that “co-exists with anxieties concerning the future,”
and this in turn has the potential to predispose the public to feelings of discomfort
managing the various uncertainties of life.10
It is these anxieties that are persuasively utilized by key decision-makers as
effective politicking in order to promote protectionist policies and activities, and to
“whip up aggression against unpopular groups.”11 As Martha Nussbaum argues:
Our time is genuinely dangerous. As we have seen, many fears are
rational, and appeals to fear have a role to play in a society that
takes human life seriously. Still, at this point, the balance has all
too often shifted in the other direction, as irresponsibly manufactured fears threaten principles we should cling to and be proud of.12
This shifting of balance contributes to the “politics of fear,” which is understood
as the method by which politicians manufacture fears to manipulate public anxieties in order to promote agendas.13 It is argued that the politics of fear is able to be
so successful because it rests upon public assumptions about danger, risk, and
uncertainty that already exist within our contemporary views of the world. It is
these assumptions, then, “buffered by news and popular culture stressing fear and
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threat as features of entertainment,”14 that help to facilitate a rhetoric of fear. By
rhetoric of fear, I am referring to the prevailing and repetitive interactions shaping
public expectation that danger, risk, and crisis are normalized within everyday life.
In times of heightened alert or crisis, the major impact of this type of rhetoric is the
promotion of a sense of disorder and lack of control.15 In a culture that has institutionalized fear of a Hobbesian “unknowable harm,”16 this rhetoric easily preconditions the community to fear. As Brian Massumi contends, a “threat is only a threat
if it retains an indeterminacy.”17 This integration of fear within our normative
assumptions and expectations of everyday life subsequently impacts upon the way
we respond to, interpret, and discuss events of significance. This impact is reflected
in a heightened public awareness of crime, terrorism, crisis, and the “securing of
the nation’s urban spaces,”18 and, as we will see, the perpetuation of self-fulfilling
fearful communication. For this reason, it is crucial to understand how a public
experience of fear is indeed expressed and constituted in the public imaginary.
TWITTER AND ARISTOTLE – EMOTION IN 140 CHARACTERS OR FEWER
Social media19 “is the next iterative step in [the] history of communications. It combines the broad reach of broadcast media with the interactive nature of interpersonal communications,”20 and as an extremely open “public forum, the internet
provides an unprecedented opportunity to share ideas on a global scale. It is userfriendly, […] and most importantly, it is both accessible and mainstream [… with]
the potential to engage an enormous audience.”21 Indeed, it has been suggested
that social media sites “are now bigger and more powerful than some nation states
[… and that these] sites [are] powerful influencers of public opinion and thought.”22
Consider how many you might have accessed in the last week? Could you go an
entire day without accessing Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Vimeo, YouTube, Blogspot, Snapchat, Flickr, Tumblr, Google Plus, or Pinterest? Using social
media is immensely popular and part of everyday interactions,23 and with 72% of
all internet users now active on social media, widespread use has meant that many
members of the public are no longer simply news consumers but are news participators,24 “citizen journalists, citizen detectives, and even cyber vigilantes […].”25 By
posting or reposting, tweeting or retweeting, headlines, links to news stories, and
personal opinions or responses to a breaking issue, the platforms of social media
become vital mechanisms through which the public not only can make sense of the
world but also express their expectations of that world. For cultural legal scholars,
social media platforms are further sites of reproduction, reflection, and resistance
of the ideological anxieties and predicaments typical in contemporary society, and
they can provide an alternate method of exploring conceptions of law as a justice
institution.
Twitter, as one of those sites, has over 550 million registered users. It “is a
medium of immediacy, information, and interactivity”26 that opens up another
32
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method by which publics can “engage with the cultural, social and political realities
with which they are confronted.”27 It is an avenue through which individuals can
“communicate and interact with the occurrences around them,”28 and is a unique
mode of information dissemination, citizen journalism, and opinion expression. The
Twitter platform invites and allows for the characterization of everyday lives
around assumptions and beliefs about safety and danger, freedom and control, and
protection and vulnerability.
Yet, because an individual is only permitted to use 140 characters in every
tweet, Twitter has “changed the concept of how people […] respond”29 to major societal events. The limited number of characters creates a “constant stream of information in one’s Twitter feed,”30 and can be quickly disseminated, retrieved, and reexperienced in perpetuity.31 Indeed, it has been argued that “the public, rather
than professional journalists are increasingly recording the first draft of history”32
and so in times of heightened alert of crisis, it is interesting and important to
explore the ways that individuals will contribute to a collective narrative surrounding issues of law and justice in response to these events.

Stories in a hashtag?
The categorization of Tweets using the hashtag symbol (#) combined with a keyword facilitates the creation of narratives surrounding current events and public
issues.33 When clicking on a hashtag word in any message you can view all the other
Tweets marked with that keyword, and you can see the development over time of a
particular story arc. It is fascinating that this utilization of hashtags within tweets
reflects our communal drive to narrativize the experiences of our world – “we can’t
help ourselves”; we interpret our lives through stories.34 This is consistent with my
previous argument that individuals deploy stories in order to frame and contextualize normative expectations of the legal system.35 Moreover, in the (re)telling of stories, individuals verbalize and render apparent that which is often omitted from
traditional accounts of law, such as the emotions, desires, and conflicting impulses
“that circulate within the law.”36 Indeed, the last couple of decades have seen an
increasing recognition that embracing “an explicit role for emotion in law is an
inherently normative enterprise.”37 This jurisprudence of emotion suggests that it
is both undesirable and impossible to exclude emotion from legal analysis and calls
for the exploration of legal meaning through emotions or affect as equally as other
cognitive and rational functionalities.38
In this article, I take up that challenge and argue that through the platform of
Twitter, legal meaning is constituted, transformed, and propagated through storied
emotional responses to crisis events. These stories are collectively formed by the
individual contributions of the users themselves as they create and then deploy
hashtags in their comments.
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The Sydney Siege hashtag (#sydneysiege) generated more than 600,000 tweets
in just two days. Not only did mainstream news outlets use this hashtag to provide
real-time updates, but also individuals were providing a constant stream of opinions
and responses to the event, in effect narrativizing it. It was, in one way, an outlet for
many to make sense of the event as it was occurring, and it was also an opportunity
to articulate reactions that might be shared by others in the community. The tweets
allowed for the retelling of the story through an emotional articulation of comments,
and the conversation both extended and transformed the rhetoric concerning law’s
narrative of justice.

Coding pathos in a hashtag
With approximately 600,000 tweets39 available during this time, the methodology
deployed was a “virtual ethnography”40 that facilitated immersion in the social setting of a trending Twitter hashtag occurring during those two days of heightened
threat and fear. By using search criteria, the dataset was reduced, however, to a
more manageable 1456 tweets.41 This dataset was then independently coded by
myself and a research assistant according to categories established from a mixture
of critical content analysis and Aristotelian rhetorical analysis.42 With tweets now
being recognized as the “new sound bites” of media that have significant rhetorical
impact,43 I found it useful to track the deployment of Aristotle’s pathos as an expression of the experience of fear. Aristotle argued that pathos is a distinct persuasive
appeal used to communicate everyday messages.44 It is an appeal to the audience’s
emotions in order to influence listeners by eliciting various emotional responses,
such as fear, anger, and contempt,45 and it petitions the audience’s sense of communal identity through the deployment of emotion in language. An enduring rhetoric
of fear depends on the persuasive force of pathos in public conversation for its perpetuation, dominance, and longevity. The emotion of fear is elicited not solely by
the situation or crisis event itself (although that is a significant factor), but also by
(and within) the commonly shared responses to that particular event.
The key objective for this study was to provide an account of how emotional livetweets during a crisis might show the connection between emotion, stories, and public critique of legality and justice. As such, I applied coding categories that exposed
the variances in the use of pathos contained in these 1456 tweets. This involved:
coding against statements that expressed an appraisal of threat, danger, or vulnerability; coding expressions of what I termed “empathetic incongruence”;46 coding
those statements that belied uncertainty around coping; and coding those expressions that attributed blame through anger.47 A major crisis event such as the Sydney Siege has the potential to bring communities together around a particular
shared passion – about issues of identity, vulnerability, and justice. Twitter not
only feeds on this but also becomes a facilitator of this newly created common
34
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ground and easily allows for the sharing of identity and community building,
through the communal grief, suffering, and general experience of calamity.
In the analysis, I found that by articulating their emotional response to the
events as they happened in the Sydney Siege, members of the public contributed to
the construction of several narratives. These were expressed through the sharing of
identity as a vulnerable public, and the resultant shared comments of anger, concern, and grief that, in turn, both provoked and resisted the rhetoric of fear. Importantly, as will be illustrated below, interwoven through this storied tapestry of
public comment was an emotional critique of legality and justice.

TWITTER ANALYSIS
Along these lines, this section provides an account of two connected narratives that
emerged from the analysis: (1) that the rhetoric of fear engages key emotional
appraisals that reinforces public belief in a just world; and (2) that the desire to
resist fear mongering is activated through an implicit yearning to maintain that
just world.
“Just” worldview
Post-9/11 we seem to live in a world that is increasingly dangerous and uncertain. It
is one often filled with people and events that cause disorder and chaos, and so is
therefore comprised of only friends or enemies. Australians, in particular, have
been positioned for many years to witness the distant suffering of the terrorist
attacks in other lands, and to be acutely aware that “we too are vulnerable to acts of
terrorism.”48 This worldview incorporates a narrative whereby we are in continuous
need of protection from our enemies by the law that exists in order to maintain a
stable, just, and secure political and social environment.49 It is a narrative that
scholars argue is cultivated and protected by governments in order to legitimize
their actions (and indeed existence):
governments have declared a seemingly never ending war on terror.
In reality, what they are doing is establishing the basis for a neverending state of fear, where supposedly only those in power have the
ability to keep people safe and secure.50
As such this narrative emphasizes the important role that a “need” for a protective justice system plays in the life of law. Theories of human behavior in social psychology have long identified justice as a core desire for people that is implemented
and protected by the law. The “belief in a just world,” as articulated by Melvin
Lerner51 reflects that people have a strong desire to live in a fair world where people
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get what they deserve and deserve what they get, and it involves “the assumptions
by which people orient themselves to their environment.”52
This just world orientation places certain expectations on the law as the
key institution that possesses the power and authority to keep the world safe and
secure. From this perspective, our need to believe that the world operates on principles of fairness influences how we evaluate law’s efficacy in the provision of justice
goals. It is then unsurprising that crisis events can so easily provoke fear and doubt
if we are uncertain about our level of safety in the world. This “just” worldview is
evident in the Twitter narrative produced through the rhetoric of fear in response
to the Sydney Siege. Take for example these tweets:
Never have I ever felt so much fear for Australia and its citizens.
What is wrong with this world? #MartinPlaceSeige #sydneysiege
#terror53
The unfolding #sydneysiege is another terrible incident in an ever
growing world of fear … .54
The hostage situation in Sydney shocked many,55 and kick-started a fatalistic
sensibility, with Australians suddenly realizing that the “chaos and danger that [previously] had been an ocean away were now all around us – it was here and no longer
just over there.”56 By relying on long-held beliefs about a just world that incorporate
expectations surrounding dualities of safety and harm, freedom and control, protection and vulnerability, the rhetoric of fear “activates the deeply entrenched good-vs
evil narrative”57 which in the end serves to reinforce law’s justice narrative.
In my analysis of the tweets during this siege, a reinforcement of the just worldview was evident within three distinct emotionally evaluative threat appraisals: (1)
an appraisal that the event was personally relevant as it made users particularly vulnerable in the everyday world (what I have named referential vulnerability); (2) a significant empathetic appraisal of the incongruence of the situation that produces an
almost corporeal narration of the event (what I have named empathetic incongruence); and (3) an appraisal of blame that is firmly grounded in anger. This section
will now work through each emotive appraisal as reflected in the Twitter narratives.
Referential vulnerability
An individual makes a statement referentially that connects the situation to their
own life, utilizing it to articulate expectations and ideas about certain aspects of
their lives.58 It is through discussing crisis events or tragedy referentially that individuals imagine what it would be like to be in that situation, and they spontaneously use the event as a springboard for relating to personal, interpersonal, or
communal attitudes and values. Sara Ahmed suggests that vulnerability can be
36
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described as “feelings of susceptibility and openness to attack” such that it involves
a “particular kind of bodily relation to the world, in which openness itself is read as
a site of potential danger.”59 Along these lines, I applied referential vulnerability as
a category representing a particular performative evaluation where the individual
expresses a disruption to their familiar worldview and subsequently relates it to
their personal experience. Tweets were therefore coded for referential vulnerability
when statements suggested that in their everyday lives, users might be unable to
protect themselves.60 The analysis showed a strong emerging narrative that
scripted individuals as “vulnerable and in dire need of protection” in their everyday
lives.61 The prism of fear through which the public viewed this event sharpened the
focus on an already present perception of our everyday world as scary, unpredictable, and chaotic, and the tweets demonstrated a heavy reliance on the persuasive
appeal of pathos, as an effective method for referentially communicating the significance that our just world was coming under threat. For example:
You can’t even go buy chocolates for Christmas anymore without
fear of being taken hostage by terrorists #unbelievable
#sydneysiege62
Is it even safe to leave your home anymore? Can we as Australians
walk freely down the street without the fear of terrorism?
#sydneysiege63
This articulated vulnerability in everyday life is, as Nussbaum argues,
“magnified by the tendency of the startle instinct to make us especially frightened
of that which leaps out suddenly catching us unawares”64 and it was especially evident in tweets that showed that the banality of getting a morning coffee was now
being corrupted by the fear of being in that very position:
Hope the #sydneysiege ends peacefully but I fear the worst [Weary
Face emoji] what sort of a world do we live in where you’re not even
safe having a coffee [Pensive Face emoji]65
What is the world coming to? You can’t go to a cafe in peace anymore
without fear that these evil barbarians will come and hold you hostage? #SydneySiege66
They went for a hot chocolate or a coffee, world turned upside down.
Hard to imagine, and too easy to imagine the fear #sydneysiege
#Lindt67
It’s stupid how nowadays we can’t even go have coffee without having that fear of getting held hostage #SydneySiege68
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The cumulative impact of fear rhetoric is to reinforce society’s consciousness of
vulnerability, and “the more powerless we feel the more we are likely to find it difficult to resist the siren call of fear.”69 Indeed, “[f]ear is nourished by the idea of a disguised enemy,”70 and the pathos appeals concerning vulnerability become quite
effective because they reinforce ideas such as: “we are all potential victims”;
“random terrorism can erupt at any moment”; and indeed that “terrorists are lurking in public spaces ready to pounce.” This is the essence of Aristotle’s argument
about the success of perpetual fear:
It follows therefore that fear is felt by those who believe something
to be likely to happen to them, at the hands of particular persons, in
a particular form, and at a particular time.71
The analysis of the tweets surrounding the Sydney Siege demonstrated that by
facilitating the circulation of fear on Twitter, personhood had been recast as the vulnerable subject.72 More than this, contained within the emerging referential narrative was evidence of corporeal vulnerability borne through fear. As the event
unfolded through the evening and night, the narrative turned to descriptions of
how this experience of fear was impacting upon individuals in a personal way. As
Ahmed argues, emotions are “spaces in which bodies and worlds meet and leak into
each other,” and in fear, “the world presses against the body.”73 Individual Twitter
users increasingly referentially expressed this “pressing of emotion on their bodies”
through an acknowledgment of the physiological impact of such a distressing situation on their ability to sleep:
I can’t sleep. Not when one of the worst nightmares is unravelling in
a place that I call home and when others fear sleeping
#sydneysiege74
I don’t want to go to sleep for fear of what I may wake up to tomorrow. I pray this ends without a soul hurt #sydneysiege
#PrayForSydney75
How anyone can sleep right now is beyond me. I’m staying wide
awake until justice is served #aslongasittakes #sydneysiege76
Just woke up randomly and checked my newsfeed to see #sydneysiege is still going on, all of a sudden, a massive fear has hit me like
a truck [Loudly Crying Face emoji]77
The referential framing of vulnerability as associated with personhood in this
way continues to affirm the just world narrative that is so prevalent within the
38
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rhetoric of fear. It proceeds from taken-for-granted assumptions that we live in a
world where the ultimate goal of law is to prevent the invasion of terror and crime
in our everyday, and we are seemingly so fearful of any threat to that security and
safety that we propagate a self-fulfilling prophetic reproduction of fearful
communication.
In particular, once images of escaping hostages started being reproduced, Twitter users began to narrate the physiological impact of their emotional responses:
Feel sick watching the coverage of the #sydneysiege on @Channel7
Three people just ran out and you could FEEL the fear they
possessed.78
Just looking at the girls running out in fear like that.. my heart is
thumping. They must’ve been terrified! [Crying Face emoji]
#sydneysiege79
The way she latches on to the police officer gives me chills. I haven’t
seen someone with that much fear in a very long time
#sydneysiege80
I feel sick. I pray for safety to all involved. I pray that the perpetrator be brought to justice. #PrayForSydney #sydneysiege81
Seeing the fear in the faces of the hostages who escaped makes my
heart sink #sydneysiege82
Can’t imagine the fear they must be going through! It got me the
goose bombs! Prayers for all in this dreadful situation
#sydneysiege83
Individuals spoke of “feeling the palpable fear” through the visuals of the hostages
escaping. As they tried to imagine how they would have been feeling in the same situation, they experienced actual physical responses. Their descriptions utilized emotive language that expressed the corporeal impact of fear and vulnerability:
“heartbreaking,” “heart wrenching,” “overwhelming,” “haunting,” “absolutely chilling,” “confronting,” “unthinkable,” “horrifying,” “my heart hurts.” Below are some
further examples:
The look on the woman’s face that ran out still gives me chills. You
could almost feel the fear she’s experiencing. #sydneysiege84
The look of pure fear on the faces of those escaping employees is putting a gulp in my throat #sydneysiege85
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I can’t watch the video of those two girls running from the building.
The terror and fear in their eyes is so confronting [Crying Face
emoji] #sydneysiege86
Empathetic incongruence87
Contributing even more to this referential vulnerability was the way in which individuals made significant empathetic appraisals concerning the incongruent nature
of the hostage crisis. Because it was a circumstance that is not at all consistent with
the just worldview that circulates within everyday legal consciousness in Australia,
individuals expressed their inability to comprehend this crisis:
Cannot begin to imagine the terror and fear in the minds of those
held hostage. Praying this will end peacefully #SydneySiege
#MartinPlace88
Can’t begin to imagine the terror and fear in the minds of the hostages held in #SydneySiege #MartinPlace. Praying and hoping
they’ll be ok89
This was a common refrain in the tweet narrative with one in every five comments
in this category referencing the inability to “imagine” what the hostages would be
experiencing.90 Empathetically incongruent statements were thus coded against
claims about the importance of the situation and its tragic, devastating and horrifying nature, and were related to ideals about public safety and security.
As mentioned above, an individual will often relate stories to their own lives or
to the lives of other real people,91 and in turn respond emotionally92 to them
through their appraisal of empathetic incongruence. In using repetitious statements such as “I can’t imagine the fear,” or “the fear on her face is terrifying,” combined with emotive language that particularly focus on the horrific and
inconceivable nature of this event, these tweets provoked an emotional identification with the victims. Take for example, these two tweets:
I can’t imagine the fear going on in Sydney how terribly awful I feel
for those innocent people taken hostage #SydneySiege pray for
them [Person With Folded Hands emoji £3]93
I’m shaking right now, how could this happen? #sydneysiege They
were innocent people! [Confounded Face emoji] [Crying Face emoji]
[Tired Face emoji] I pray that justice will be served to that man.94
By describing their attempt to imagine themselves in such a situation, individuals became highly emotionalized spectators of the distant suffering of the victims.
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But more than this, the individualized impassioned tweets become part of the empathetic imagination expressed by the collective. This in turn, has enormous normative significance for law, which is “an expression and satisfaction of emotions.”95
Indeed, Robert Solomon argues that without an “empathetic perspective, there can
be no adequate conception of justice or law,”96 and certainly collective narratives
that emerge on Twitter have the potential to define, rationalize and shape expectations of law.
In the analysis, it was clear that as individuals responded emotively to the Sydney Siege, the emerging narrative corroborated a “just” worldview whereby the protection of innocence is favored as one key goal of justice. This is evident in the
following tweets where individuals deploy the good versus evil narrative to
emotively assign innocence to the victims in contradistinction to the guilt of the
perpetrator:
16C hours of fear placed on innocent people who were just going
about their daily lives … Praying they escape unharmed
#sydneysiege97
It’s a tragedy that three people were killed in the #SydneySiege, two
completely innocent. We need to know HOW they died. They
deserve justice98
Shedding tears again for people I don’t know. Innocent victims who
died in fear #sydneysiege99
In this narrative, innocent people have been thrust into fearful situations that
they do not deserve, nor should have to endure under the protection of the law in
their “daily lives.” The proliferation of this narrative and the concept of the
“innocent victim,” has significant persuasive appeal because it perpetuates the narrative of a collective innocent and threatened “us” in relation to a malevolent and
destructive “them,” which works to fortify a just worldview. The tweets collectively
work to align the audience emotionally with a shared attribution of evil, or guilt, or
terrorism, as the “other” that is endangering what is “ours.”100
If a single person dies in this siege I fear Australia will never be the
same #sydneysiege101
Why do I fear that the #sydneysiege has already scarred our nation
forever? #prayforsydney102
This evil other threatens to diminish and destroy what “we” so dearly possess and
value: our legitimate “just” world. In this way, the rhetoric of fear manifested in collective statements of either referential vulnerability or empathetic incongruence, invites
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the adoption of the “us v them” mentality by persuasively working on our emotions.103
In emotively articulating the cumulative experience of fear during this time, the Twitter narrative contributes to a shared expectation and assumption around law’s role as
protector, and in combination, the rhetoric of fear and the expression of emotion on
Twitter, thus work through this othering to reinforce a justice worldview. Interestingly, in times of crisis, emotions related to this othering, are cultivated and recirculated by “recurrent […] polemics, rationalities” and stories that often turn the tide of
public comment into a “blaming game,”104 and this connects with the third emotive
appraisal that is tied to the fortification of law’s justice narrative.
The blame game – critique of law
Becoming a collective “us” means “developing a certain rage against these illegitimate others […]”105 and it is exactly the fragility and vulnerability of our just world
that provokes the conflation of law and justice within the public imagination, which
in turn provokes a questioning of the legitimacy of the law, and its ability to cope
with threatening crisis events. The rhetoric of fear manifests itself in a widespread
perception of powerlessness, and our fears become expressed as complaint or critique
not only about those who might be responsible, but also about those whom may have
had the power to stand against it, or prevent it from happening in the first place.
Tweets were thus coded for statements that attributed blame and responsibility
for the incongruent, harmful and threatening event. In many instances politicians
or judges were seen to be at fault:
At least we are blaming the justice system now. So let’s go bash
some judges. They wear funny headwear. Don’t ride with judges.
#sydneysiege106
Yet, primarily the criticism was leveled at the institution or system of “justice”
more generally.107 To attribute blame on the justice system is a familiar framing of
events within a retributive context that provokes outrage and ire when the “evil
others” do not seem to “get what they deserve,” or have been let loose to perpetrate
their crimes:108
You know who’s at fault for this whole Sydney Siege. Our justice
system. That man should not have been walking the streets
#sydneysiege109
The justice system has failed two people miserably. No amount of
words that can now bring comfort to… #sydneysiege110
#sydneysiege Tragedy this morning. Two innocent lives lost. Can’t
help but feel that justice system in Australia is not good enough.111
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The typical and repetitive catch cry that “the justice system has failed” comes
from an innate desire to hold individuals responsible for their actions, and it forms
part of the “just” worldview that persists in public discourse. It feeds into what I
have previously argued is an instinctive retributive public imaginary that contains
a strong belief that the function and promise of law is actually to provide justice.112
Indeed, many of the tweets fuel criticism of law’s claim to facilitate justice by a reference to what is lacking. Take for example these tweets that demonstrate a common negative collocation of ineffective law and an absent justice:
#sydneysiege highlights how inadequate criminal justice system in
dealing with the criminals. Man with multiple criminal charges in
society113
The Australian justice system has failed the victims of the #sydneysiege. It’s ridiculous to think that Haron Monis was allowed to walk
free114
As the Sydney Siege continued throughout the day, more details about the gunman and his legal history surfaced. Information circulated that Monis had been
“the subject of many law enforcement and security investigations and assessments
over the period of his residence in Australia,” and in particular that he had been
granted “bail for serious violent offences at the time of the siege.”115 In response to
this information, the narrative appearing in the tweets increasingly articulated
that because the law hasn’t done its job properly (i.e., remanded the offender so that
he is no threat to society), then there is a complete failure of the justice system.
How come this headcase was wandering around in society? How did
he have a gun? Yet another fail for the justice system.
#sydneysiege116
Why was this moron out on bail in the first place?? A complete and
total failure of the justice system! #SydneySiege117
The justice system has failed this country again, how was this
fcken dog to live freely in this country!?!? What a joke!
#sydneysiege118
The implied message of this repetitious narrative was that this one event is an
horrific example of injustice proliferating within our legal system – that if the law
actually dealt with offenders effectively then there would not be such a threat to
our everyday existence, and we could live without fear.
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What these tweets of emotional critique demonstrate, is a legitimation of a just
worldview where law is expected to consistently and faithfully achieve “justice,”
and that it is the failure of law’s procedure and implementation that jeopardizes the
achievement of justice as the primary goal of law:
Incredibly sad to hear two hostages lost their lives. May your deaths
not have been in vain. Overhaul the justice system. #sydneysiege119
Why was a known murderer and rapist walking free among us? Our
flawed justice system allowed #Sydneysiege to happen. We need
reform #auspol120
Of course in the days following the siege, there was expansive public debate over
the merits of bail law reforms (which contributed to the joint state/federal government review), and this became a huge part of the continuing Twitter narrative
within the hashtag Sydney Siege. While, an analysis of this ongoing attribution of
blame to the bail system, and especially its impact on law’s justice narrative, is
beyond the scope of this article, the next section describes the second narrative or
story arc that developed over the course of those two days: that is, the recognition of
the constructed nature (and potential negative impact) of fear mongering and the
active desire to resist it.

Fear mongering and resistance
As discussed above, the Twitter narrative produced over the two days of this hostage crisis, reflected in many ways an existing rhetoric of fear that traded on emotional expectations of law and justice. Yet, so much of the Twitter conversation
showed a defiant determination to resist the temptation of fear mongering perpetuated by mass media:
#Sydneysiege; stop spreading fear and hatred, instead pray for all to
be solved quickly with no harm to any of the hostage.121
Screw people who try to terrorise us into frenzy of fear and hatred.
You will not affect us or our lives. We choose how we live
#sydneysiege122
In fact, some blame for fear mongering was placed on politicians:
I just wish I could see past the way politicians use a tragic incident
like this to create fear and spew hyperbolic crap #sydneysiege123
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#sydneysiege leaders should provide comfort and solace during
times of uncertainty. Why did @TonyAbbottMHR choose to heighten
fear and terror?124
However, over 50% of all tweets coded critical were directed at mass media. It
was clear that the emotion of anger was used within this particular hashtag as a
mechanism for collectively expressing considerable critique about, and resistance
to, the constructed nature of news reporting, and on the way these constructions
have the power to impact perceptions, and manipulate “reality.”
Media coverage of the #sydneysiege has been abysmal. Speculation,
bigotry and fear-mongering abound; shameful and utterly
irresponsible.125
Spread fact, not fear, or “good headlines” #sydneysiege126
Speculation only spreads unnecessary fear! Some shocking clickbaiting and inaccurate reporting from Australian media today.
#sydneysiege127
By ascribing manipulative intent to the production of news, the tweets actively
challenged the message that news reports comprise a truthful repository of facts,
and they began to produce a story of resistance – using the concepts of unity and
identity. Sydneysiders and Australians used tweets that promoted nationhood and
local identity as the driving force toward unification in standing against fear. Even
the lyrics of John Farnham’s very Australian “You’re the Voice” were appropriated
for this purpose encouraging sydneysiders to not sit silently, nor live in fear.
Today my beautiful city weeps, even as we stand as one. We won’t
cower to fear or hate. We’re stronger than that! #sydneysiege128
Stay strong Sydney, we cannot let this stop us in our tracks and live
in fear #sydneysiege #PrayersForSydney129
Amid the wealth of data to be analyzed about this public response to the media’s
manipulation of the rhetoric of fear, what I found most intriguing about these
tweets of resistance during this time was the utilization of “othering” as a mechanism for that resistance. That is, the reason most often articulated as the motivation to resist fear itself, was the recognition of the potential negative impacts of
“othering.”
Research conducted after 9/11 has shown that “in times of heightened fear and
anxiety, stereotypes are exacerbated, identity with one’s own group (people we
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perceive to be like ourselves) [is] increased [and] suspicion of other groups is heightened, [as] we hold tightly to familiar/default scenarios.”130 The cultivation of the “us
v them” mentality then, as an invocation of the power of law within the rhetoric of
fear, provides the “means by which inclusion and exclusion takes place.”131 The
“other” becomes a racialized image of threat, which is “criminalized and
stigmatized”132 and preconceived notions and stereotypes play a role in how individuals will perceive the situation. Unfortunately, one of the nastier aspects to the
pathos displayed within this Twitter narrative was the anger and disgust expressed
towards Islam and to members of the Muslim community. Reading through the
tweets as I undertook the analysis, this racialization of the threat was overwhelmingly strong, as evidenced by just these two examples:
It’s time for the world to denounce sharia law and the savages who
support it. GET OUT OF OUR COUNTRY! #sydneysiege
#NoAmnesty133
Wherever in the world #Islam goes, mayhem, chaos, fear, terror,
death and destruction always follow… #sydneysiege #lindtcafe134
At the same time, while this utilization of othering to express hatred and accusation was so prominent in the hashtag, it was also encouraging to read a divergent
concern about the impact of such a communication of hatred.135 One particular
story arc that developed within the Twitter narrative was the deep concern that cultural bigotry fueled by the hostage crisis might actually heighten emotional
responses to the point of creating its own harm – in the form of a backlash against
Muslim Australians:
I’m terrified and appalled of how much hate, racism and bigotry I
see all over social media. I fear for all our Muslim citizens ;-(
#sydneysiege136
I fear for the hostages. I fear for the backlash by an angry and often
ignorant public just as much. #SydneySiege137
To all Muslims in Australia stay safe and protect yourself. I cannot
imagine the fear you will get in our streets. xx #sydneysiege138
These tweets are an example of how the emotive expression of fear can perpetuate “otherness” associated with racial and cultural difference, which is then persuasively deployed as either hate or sympathy. For this article, I have focused the
analysis on the use of othering as a way to promote solidarity and invoke resistance,
evidenced particularly in one strong narrative arc. In this narrative, Muslims were
framed as vulnerable “outsiders” in need of protection, and so before long a hashtag
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“social movement” was borne. Thousands of individuals adopted the #illridewithyou
hashtag to offer practical support by riding on public transport with Muslims who
might be intimidated or apprehensive to travel alone. This “organic and spontaneous social media campaign gained momentum quickly.”139 There were 40,000
tweets using the hashtag #Illridewithyou in just two hours and within a day over
900,000 tweets using the hashtag had been posted as it trended globally.140
As an “exercise in viral empathy,”141 the #illridewithyou campaign was
undoubtedly positive. Despite some critics claiming that #illridewithyou was
“patronising, and a shallow and ineffective attempt to combat the deeper issues of
discrimination, racism and Islamophobia,”142 #illridewithyou did gain widespread
attention because it actively sought to change the tone of the public conversation
concerning the rhetoric of fear and make an impact on the emotional experience of
fear caused by this event.
However, without denigrating or denying the positive effects of the campaign on
a public experience of fear, I argue that this practical and symbolic resistance of the
rhetoric of fear paradoxically represented a show of support and solidarity with
Australian Muslims, and also a fragmentation of trust in the law to protect a portion of our community. The distrust and uncertainty was so great, that citizens
used the virtual environment of Twitter as an outlet for social activism. Interestingly, the desire for individuals to take matters into their own hands143 and enact
their own version of protective justice, was heightened by the very rhetoric of fear
that some were trying to resist.144
Although it was heartwarming and encouraging to read comments that actively
sought to persuade others to contest the encumbering effects of the rhetoric of fear,
ironically this campaign nevertheless pointed to an underlying concern (whether
substantiated or not) that some citizens may actually be vulnerable to attack, and
demonstrated that individuals can be mobilized into action (both positive and negative) for the purposes of filling a perceived vacuum in law’s security and
protection.145

CONCLUSIONS
The #illridewithyou narrative that was occurring in tandem with the #sydneysiege
narrative serves as a practical illustration of emotional jurisprudence at work.
Through the articulation of emotion – fear, anger, vulnerability and compassion –
individuals contributed to a collective emotional critique of law’s capability to provide the protection it promises when it really counts. Public comments expressed in
these Twitter narratives significantly deployed the persuasive appeal of pathos to
provoke, engage, and animate imagination in relation to the maintenance of the
“just” world in which they believe. The analysis of the tweets has shown that in the
production of narrative surrounding this event, Twitter not only reflected anxieties
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around issues of law and justice but also functioned as the social agent through
which tweets would either promote or challenge those very anxieties.
I have argued that social media facilitates the sharing of identity and community building through the telling and retelling of stories in relation to various issues
and events. The Sydney Siege was an evocative event that depicted a possible fracturing of the just worldview to which we hold so tightly, and so the communal experience of fear, grief, anger, and compassion reflected emotional coping strategies
that functioned as a stimulant to the acceptance and preservation of law’s justice
narrative. There is so much to glean about legal consciousness from social media.
Living as we do in a hashtag world, it is important for us to recognize the nuanced
complexities of social media and in particular the complicity of emotion and social
media in public reflections of legal meaning.
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